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Bottom-up processes can interrupt ongoing cognitive processing in order to adaptively
respond to emotional stimuli of high potential significance, such as those that threaten
wellbeing. However it is vital that this interference can be modulated in certain contexts
to focus on current tasks. Deficits in the ability to maintain the appropriate balance
between cognitive and emotional demands can severely impact on day-to-day activities.
This fMRI study examined this interaction between threat processing and cognition; 18
adult participants performed a visuospatial working memory (WM) task with two load
conditions, in the presence and absence of anxiety induction by threat of electric shock.
Threat of shock interfered with performance in the low cognitive load condition; however
interference was eradicated under high load, consistent with engagement of emotion
regulation mechanisms. Under low load the amygdala showed significant activation to
threat of shock that was modulated by high cognitive load. A directed top-down control
contrast identified two regions associated with top-down control; ventrolateral PFC and
dorsal ACC. Dynamic causal modeling provided further evidence that under high cognitive
load, top-down inhibition is exerted on the amygdala and its outputs to prefrontal regions.
Additionally, we hypothesized that individual differences in a separate, non-emotional
top-down control task would predict the recruitment of dorsal ACC and ventrolateral PFC
during top-down control of threat. Consistent with this, performance on a separate dichotic
listening task predicted dorsal ACC and ventrolateral PFC activation during high WM load
under threat of shock, though activation in these regions did not directly correlate with
WM performance. Together, the findings suggest that under high cognitive load and threat,
top-down control is exerted by dACC and vlPFC to inhibit threat processing, thus enabling
WM performance without threat-related interference.
Keywords: emotion, emotion regulation, top-down control, prefrontal cortex (PFC), amygdala, anterior cingulate
cortex, anxiety, DCM
PREFRONTAL INHIBITION OF THREAT PROCESSING
REDUCES WORKING MEMORY INTERFERENCE
In daily life we regulate our emotions continuously and auto-
matically in order to remain focused on current thoughts and
actions. There must be a balance between the ability to detect
and attend to potentially significant, sometimes threatening emo-
tional stimuli, and the ability to focus on current goals without
unnecessary interruptions. In typical situations this balance is
likely to be maintained automatically with little need for individ-
uals to employ deliberate emotion regulation strategies (Mauss
et al., 2007). However, anxiety is associated with reduced top-
down control over threat related distractors (Bishop et al., 2004)
and deficits in maintaining this balance are apparent in cases of
highly anxious individuals where intrusive threat-related percep-
tions and thoughts severely impact day-to-day activities (Etkin
et al., 2010). Interference by emotions and emotional stimuli
may be overcome by top-down control mechanisms that either
facilitate and protect task-related processing, inhibit the inter-
fering emotional effects or a combination of the two. It is not
clear whether overcoming emotional interference occurs with a
concomitant regulation of subjective emotion, with the majority
of studies using emotional stimuli as opposed to induced emo-
tions per se. Here, we examined the interplay between bottom-up
threat detection systems and top-down control mechanisms using
a spatial WM task performed under threat of electric shock. We
also investigated whether individual differences in a completely
independent non-emotional attentional control task predict the
recruitment of top-down control mechanisms in an emotional
control task.
The neural basis of emotion regulation has been primarily
studied by explicitly instructing participants to reappraise emo-
tional stimuli (Ochsner et al., 2002; Schaefer et al., 2002; Ochsner
and Gross, 2008), implicating a brain network including lateral
and ventral prefrontal and cingulate regions. Fewer studies have
used tasks in which regulating emotion is required but not explic-
itly instructed. An example is cognitive tasks performed in the
context of emotional distractors or some form of emotion induc-
tion, for example anxiety (Dolcos andMcCarthy, 2006; Shackman
et al., 2006), which can impair task performance (Dolcos and
McCarthy, 2006; Shackman et al., 2006; Blair et al., 2007; Oei
et al., 2012), particularly for anxious individuals (Fales et al.,
2008; Cisler and Koster, 2010). There is some evidence that
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 228 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Clarke and Johnstone Prefrontal inhibition of threat processing
this interference is reduced when the cognitive load of the task
increases (Erthal et al., 2005; Van Dillen and Koole, 2009; Vytal
et al., 2012), possibly through the automatic engagement of lateral
prefrontal top-down control mechanisms that inhibit subcortical
regions involved in emotional responding such as the amygdala
(Blair et al., 2007; Van Dillen et al., 2009). However, results are
not consistent with other studies reporting greater interference
with increasing load (Eysenck et al., 2007).
Lavie’s load model (Lavie et al., 2004) attempts to reconcile
similar incongruences that exist in the non-emotional cogni-
tion and attention domain. Under this framework a distinction
between perceptual and cognitive load determines whether dis-
tracting stimuli produce interference; under increasing percep-
tual load fewer resources are available to process the distracting
stimuli and so interference is reduced whilst with increasing cog-
nitive load there are fewer cognitive resources available to exert
top-down control and so interference increases. It is not clear
how such a system may operate for emotional distractors. A
straightforward translation of Lavie’s model would posit that
tasks involving high perceptual load might deplete perceptual
resources to such an extent that potentially significant emotional
stimuli escape processing, and therefore such tasks do not show
effects of interference from emotional stimuli, whereas tasks with
high cognitive load will. Indeed, the perceptual load model can
account for some results, for example the diminished emotional
interference in Erthal et al. (2005) where increased load is percep-
tual (comparing the orientation of peripherally presented bars) as
are the emotional stimuli (negative images). A direct translation
of Lavie’s model cannot account, however, for a number of stud-
ies where emotional interference is diminished by high cognitive
load (e.g., Van Dillen and Koole, 2009; Vytal et al., 2012). In addi-
tion, emotional stimuli gain preferential processing compared to
non-emotional stimuli (Dolan and Vuilleumier, 2003; Alpers and
Gerdes, 2007; Stout et al., 2013), and automatic processing of
threatening stimuli can lead to increased emotional responding
outside of awareness (Whalen et al., 1998; Vuilleumier et al., 2002;
Dolan and Vuilleumier, 2003). Therefore, it is unclear whether
high perceptual load could reduce perceptual resources to such
an extent that emotional stimuli, particularly threatening stimuli,
are no longer processed. On the other hand, a model that includes
active top-down control allows for the processing and subsequent
control of emotional, potentially threatening stimuli.
Many studies suggest top-down control of emotion shares
common mechanisms with top-down mechanisms for (non-
emotional) attentional control and response inhibition (e.g.,
Pessoa et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004b; Stevens et al.,
2007; Etkin et al., 2011; Shackman et al., 2011). Two specific
brain regions, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) and
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) implicated in emotion
regulation (Blair et al., 2007; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Van
Dillen et al., 2009) overlap with regions commonly identified
in studies of cognitive control (e.g., Herath et al., 2001; Dux
et al., 2006). Dorsal ACC is implicated in performance monitor-
ing and detecting when control is necessary (MacDonald et al.,
2000; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a) possibly by conflict monitor-
ing (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns, 2006;
Botvinick, 2007; Kim et al., 2011) or by comparing actual and
predicted outcomes (Alexander and Brown, 2011), whilst lateral
PFC regions including vlPFC are posited to be involved in imple-
menting the appropriate attentional or behavioral adjustments
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a; King et al., 2010). In one study of
healthy adolescents using versions of a counting Stroop task, emo-
tion control activated vlPFC, cognitive control activated dlPFC
and both conditions activated an area in between, BrodmannArea
(BA) 45 (inferior frontal gyrus), with higher activation in faster
responders (Mincic, 2010). The authors suggested BA 45 serves as
a commonmechanism for top-down attentional control in cogni-
tive and emotional contexts. Ochsner et al. (2008) used different
versions of the Erkisen flanker task to examine response and affec-
tive conflict, observing common dACC and dlPFC activity but
rostral medial PFC and left vlPFC were differentially activated
by affective versus cognitive conflict. Similarly Krug and Carter
(2010) used emotional and non-emotional versions of a facial
Stroop task showing commonalities in dlPFC and dACC activity
in both tasks.
One aspect of previous studies of top-down control of emotion
that might explain discrepant findings is the nature of the emo-
tional stimuli. Most previous research on top-down control of
emotion has used emotional stimuli designed to distract from the
cognitive task due to the salience of the stimulus, rather than due
to any actual induced emotion. In this study we were interested
in the mechanisms of emotional control that allow an individual
to overcome the detrimental effects of an experienced emotion—
induced anxiety—in order to perform a completely unrelated
cognitive task.
We conducted an fMRI study of an emotional control task
where anticipatory anxiety was induced by threat of shock whilst
participants performed a visuospatial WM task under two load
conditions (based on Shackman et al., 2006). We hypothesized
that high WM load would reduce interference from threatening
stimuli via an active top-down control mechanism, and that this
effect would correspond to increased lateral PFC and dACC acti-
vation and decreased amygdala activation. We also aimed to test
two possible active mechanisms bywhich interference from irrele-
vant stimuli can be overcome; facilitating task-related processing
and inhibiting threat processing. Dynamic causal modeling was
employed to compare the evidence for cognitive facilitation ver-
sus threat inhibition. We further predicted that an index of
non-emotional top-down control taken from participant’s per-
formance on a dichotic listening task would predict activation in
the same brain regions as emotional top-down control, pointing
to a possible overlap in the neural circuitry underlying general
adaptive top-down control.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteen volunteers (13 female) took part in the study. One par-
ticipant was excluded from all analyses due to performing at
chance on the emotional control task leaving 18 participants (13
Female) aged between 21 and 40 (mean = 25, S.D = 5) with nor-
mal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. All participants
were right-handed and did not report any history of neurolog-
ical or psychiatric problems. Participants were scanned at the
University of Reading Centre for Integrative Neuroscience and
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Neurodynamics (CINN). Participants gave fully informed con-
sent and the research was approved by the University of Reading
Research Ethics Committee. All participants received images of
their brain as compensation for their time.
PROCEDURE
There were two components to this study. The task used to
directly assess spontaneous top-down regulation of emotion was
a visuospatial WM task with threat of shock to induce anxi-
ety. A directed dichotic listening task was used as an index of
non-emotional top-down attentional control.
VISUOSPATIAL WM TASK
This n-back WM task was based on the study by Shackman et al.
(2006) and consisted of a 2 (WM Load: Low Load/High Load)
by 2 (Threat: Safe/Threat) within-subjects factorial design, with
trials presented in blocks corresponding to the 4 experimental
conditions (Low Load/Safe, Low Load/Threat, High Load/Safe
and High Load/Threat. The structure of the task is shown in
Figure 1. Each trial presentation consisted of a box containing
one of six letters in one of eight locations; the remaining area
of the display was occupied by a random array of letters. The
box was presented for 350ms, followed by an inter-trial interval
(1500ms) where the box disappeared but the background array
of letters remained, following which the box reappeared. On 2-
back trials participants judged whether the box displayed on the
current trial occurred in the same spatial location two trials previ-
ously (and responded accordingly with a button press), whilst on
3-back trials they indicated whether the box appeared in the same
location three trials previously. As in Shackman et al. (2006), the
boxes appeared in overlapping, asymmetric, non-cardinal loca-
tions to encourage the use of visuospatial WM as opposed to
verbal strategies. The task was presented using E-Prime 2 soft-
ware (Psychological Software Tools Inc.) and a Nordic Neuro Labs
goggle visual display system displaying the stimuli at 60Hz on
an 800 × 600 pixel screen, with a field of view of 30 × 23◦. The
goggles included a built in infrared camera for recording relative
pupil dilation (recorded using 60Hz sample rate).
The possibility of receiving an unpleasant electrical shock to
the index finger of the non-dominant hand was used to induce
anxiety. Blocks were either Safe or Threat as indicated before the
block began and throughout by the background color (counter-
balanced across participants). In Safe blocks, participants were
told that there was no possibility of shock whilst in Threat blocks
FIGURE 1 | Trial structure for 2- and 3-back blocks showing match and
no-match trials. Participants must indicate whether the box is located in the
same position as 2 or 3 trials previously. Each box was presented for 350ms,
separated by 1500ms where only the background array of random letters is
shown. Participants could answer any time from the box first appearing to
the next box being shown.
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participants were told that they may receive one or more electric
shocks. Each block began with a 4 s display indicating the type of
block (2- or 3-back) with the background color representing the
threat level.
During a training phase in which the visuospatial WM task
was performed outside the scanner, electric shocks were delivered
via an ADInstruments ML856 PowerLab 26T Isolated Stimulator
using anMLADDF30 stimulating bar electrode with 30mm spac-
ing of 9mm contacts. Each participant’s stimulation level was
set by first exposing them to an electric stimulation of 1mA (10
pulses at 50Hz, with a pulse duration of 200µs) and increas-
ing the current in steps of 0.5mA, up to a maximum of 10mA,
until a suitable participant-specific threshold was found that was
uncomfortable and unpleasant but not painful. This level was
then used throughout the task for that subject (subject-specific
levels ranged between 3mA and 10mA). Participants were told
they would receive between one and 20 random shocks through-
out the course of the experiment, and that the intensity of stim-
ulation would vary. In fact, during the training WM task prior
to scanning, shocks were delivered during 50% of Threat blocks.
This setup allowed practice in the task, ensured that experience
of the electric shock was unpleasant and that the threat of shock
was capable of inducing anxiety. During the scan sham electrodes
were used meaning that the scan was free from contamination by
shocks, though identical instructions were given. At the end of
each block, participants rated their level of anxiety in the preced-
ing block on a sliding scale ranging from 0 (not at all anxious)
to 10 (extremely anxious) moving in steps of 0.25. After the scan
participants were asked whether they did in fact believe during
the scan that there was a chance of receiving any electric shocks.
Each block contained 18 response trials and lasted 45 s, with 4
blocks of each of the 4 experimental conditions. As the task was
repetitive in nature and required continuous concentration from
the participant, the task was divided into two scan runs of eight
blocks with a break period in between. The order of conditions
was counterbalanced across participants.
DICHOTIC LISTENING TASK
The dichotic listening task (Hugdahl et al., 2009) was carried out
prior to scanning on the same day as the visuospatial WM task.
This involved the auditory presentation of stimuli simultaneously
to the right and left ears. The stimuli consisted of six syllables
comprising the stop-consonants b, d, g, p, t, and k combined
with the vowel a (/ba/, /pa/, etc.). These six syllables were com-
bined into 36 pairs (including the homonyms) with one being
played to the left and the other to the right ear. Each syllable
had a duration of approximately 350ms, with an interval between
presentations of 4 s. Participants repeated back the sound they
heard and this was then marked down by the researcher. There
were three conditions; non-forced, forced right and forced left.
In the non-forced condition there was no special instruction to
direct attention towards either ear, whilst in the forced right and
forced left conditions participants were instructed to listen only
to the right or left ear respectively and ignore any sound they
heard through the other ear. Each condition composed a full run
of the 36 syllable combinations. The non-forced condition was
always carried out first and participants were advised not to spend
too long thinking about their answer and if they believed they
had heard more than one sound to indicate which sound they
heard most clearly. The orders of the forced right and left con-
ditions were counterbalanced across participants. The procedure
and stimuli used have been used elsewhere (e.g., Hugdahl, 1995)
and the ability to direct attention to either ear in dichotic lis-
tening tasks has been proposed as an index of top-down control
(Hugdahl et al., 2009).
Participants’ responses were recorded as they performed the
task. These were later classified as correctly producing the sylla-
ble presented to the left ear (Correct Left), correctly producing
the syllable presented to the right ear (Correct Right), or incor-
rect. Trials where identical sounds were presented to both ears
were not scored but used to ensure typical hearing. An index of
top-down control was calculated for each participant; this was
taken as the sum of Correct Right in the forced right condition
minus Correct Right in the non-forced condition and Correct
Left in the forced left condition minus Correct Left in the non-
forced condition. Higher scores represent a greater ability to direct
attention to either ear compared to the control condition. The
demeaned scores were used to perform a regression analysis to
identify regions where activation in the emotional control task
correlated with non-emotional attentional control.
MRI ACQUISITION
Two identical T2∗-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) func-
tional scans lasting 7min and 44 s were acquired (TR = 2 s,
TE = 30ms, flip angle = 90◦, FOV = 192 × 192mm, 3 × 3mm
voxels, slice thickness 4mm with an interslice gap of 1mm,
30 axial slices), separated by a short break and recalibration of
the eye tracking system. Participants held an MRI-compatible
response box in their dominant right hand, with the sham stim-
ulating electrodes attached to the index finger of the left hand.
Following completion of the functional scans, a high-resolution
T1-weighted anatomical scan was acquired (MPRAGE, 1 × 1mm
in-plane resolution, 256 × 256mm FOV, axial slices with 1mm
slice thickness).
MRI DATA PROCESSING
fMRI analyses were carried out in Feat version 5.98 part of
FSL (FMRIB’s Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Brain
extraction was carried out using the FSL Brain Extraction
Tool (BET; Smith, 2002). Motion correction using MCFLIRT
(Jenkinson et al., 2002), Gaussian smoothing (FWHM5mm) and
a 200 s high pass temporal filter were employed. First-level GLM
analysis was carried out for each functional scan run and then the
two runs of each participant were combined using a fixed effects
analysis. Separate regressors were specified for each of the four
experimental conditions (Low Load/Safe, Low Load/Threat, High
Load/Safe, and High Load/Threat) by convolving a binary box-
car function with an ideal haemodynamic response. A regressor
for the anxiety rating period was included, as were six motion
parameters to model residual signal changes due to participant
motion.
Two main effect contrasts were defined; the first to reveal
WM Load-related activity by identifying regions more active in
High Load compared to Low Load trials (High Load/Safe +
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High Load/Threat − Low Load/Safe − Low Load/Threat) and
the second to reveal regions more active under threat than safety
(Low Load/Threat + High Load/Threat− Low Load/Safe− High
Load/Safe).
In addition to these main effect analyses, directed contrasts
were set to address specific questions of this study. Firstly, a con-
trast was defined to identify top-down control activity by looking
for areas with activation greater in the condition posited to engen-
der top-down control (High Load/Threat) compared to all others.
Secondly, a contrast to identify areas more active in the Low
Load/Threat condition versus all others was defined to identify
regions associated with emotional responding to threat that is
reduced under high cognitive load. Given the strong a priori evi-
dence for the role of the amygdala in negative emotions including
anxiety (LeDoux, 2003; Kalin et al., 2004; Etkin andWager, 2007;
Etkin et al., 2009), a region of interest analysis was carried out
with a bilateral amygdala mask (threshold 25% of the Harvard-
Oxford subcortical atlas (FMRIB Software Library). Furthermore,
a regression analysis with each participant’s index of top-down
control taken from the dichotic listening task was performed
to identify how individual differences in top-down control of
attention in a non-emotional task may predict individual differ-
ences in engagement of particular brain regions in the emotional
control task.
Contrast images were registered to a standard space template
(MNI152_T1_2mm_brain) with FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith,
2001; Jenkinson et al., 2002) using a two stage linear registra-
tion (functional-structural-template). Higher-level mixed effect
analysis using OLS consisted of regressors for the group mean,
demeaned dichotic listening scores and demeaned belief in receiv-
ing a shock (coded with 1 for expressing no doubt and −1 for
expressing any). Whole-brain analysis was carried out using clus-
ter thresholding based on Random Field Theory (Worsley, 2001)
to ensure a corrected p < 0.05.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Anxiety induction
In order to reduce the effect of response biases (e.g., participants
tending to cluster around one part of the scale) anxiety ratings
were standardized using each participant’s average rating and
standard deviation across all conditions. A 2 × 2 within subject
ANOVA with anxiety rating as the dependent variable revealed
a significant main effect of threat of shock [F(1, 17) = 9.697,
p = 0.006] with a greater anxiety rating in Threat compared to
Safe blocks. Neither WM Load [F(1, 18) = 2.208, p = 0.155] nor
the interaction [F(1, 18) = 0.109, p = 0.745] reached significance.
Whilst the absolute ratings of anxiety [scaled from 0 (‘not at all
anxious’) to 10 (‘extremely anxious’)] were low (threat = 4.3,
S.D = 1.33; safety = 3.6, S.D = 1.48), the significant main effect
supports the conclusion that threat of shock successfully induced
anxiety.
Visuospatial WM Performance
In order to make decisive inferences about the differential effects
of anxiety at both WM loads it is important to demonstrate
psychometric equivalence. Discriminating power (Chapman and
Chapman, 2001) was calculated by multiplying reliability in
Safe conditions (measured by Cronbach’s alpha) by the accu-
racy variance. This indicates the sensitivity of a test to detect an
experimental manipulation. There was no significant difference
in discriminating power in Low Load compared to High Load
[t(17) = −0.367, p = 0.718] conditions suggesting the sensitivity
to detect an effect of threat was the same at both loads.
A within-subject ANOVA revealed a main effect of WM Load
[F(1, 17) = 15.865, p = 0.001], with significantly better perfor-
mance on 2-back (86.8%, S.D = 10.24) than 3-back (81.8%,
S.D = 12.21) trials. There was nomain effect of Threat [F(1, 17) =
0.422, p = 0.525] but a significant WM Load × Threat interac-
tion effect [F(1, 17) = 17.480, p = 0.001]. Under the Low Load
condition threat of shock significantly interfered with perfor-
mance [Low Load/Safe vs. Low Load/Threat; mean difference
= +3.8%, S.D = 4.8; t(17) = 3.370, p = 0.004] whereas under
increased cognitive load there was no significant interference
from threat of shock, in fact there was a trend for an improvement
in performance [High Load/Safe vs. High Load/Threat; mean
difference = −2.5%, S.D = 5.8; t(17) = −1.792, p = 0.091]
(see Figure 2).
This interference effect was not the result of a speed-
accuracy trade-off; reaction times were slower in Threat
(733ms, S.D = 151.7) than Safe conditions (703ms, S.D =
154.6) [F(1, 17) = 14.254, p = 0.002] with no significant interac-
tion effect [F(1, 17) = 0.074, p = 0.789]. As expected there was a
main effect of WM Load [F(1, 17) = 4.825, p = 0.042] with faster
responses in the 2-back (706ms, S.D = 139) than 3-back (730ms,
S.D = 168) conditions.
PUPIL DILATION
Pupil dilation has been shown to be a reliable index of cognitive
effort (Beatty, 1982; Steinhauer and Hakerem, 1992) as well as
reflecting emotional arousal (Bradley et al., 2008). Whilst com-
pleting the WM task in the scanner pupil width was recorded via
FIGURE 2 | WM accuracy in the emotional top-down control task. In
the Low Load condition (2-back) threat significantly interfered with
performance, whilst in the High Load condition (3-back) there was no
interference from threat. Error bars display within-subject standard error
(Morey, 2008). ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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the in-built monocular eye tracker. Due to technical issues data
could only be analysed from 13 of the 19 participants. Percentage
changes from the participant’s mean pupil diameter were calcu-
lated for each condition and displayed a significant main effect
of WM Load [F(1, 14.406) = 10.448, p = 0.006] and a borderline
significant WM Load × Threat interaction [F(1, 18.644) = 4.689,
p = 0.073]. Greatest pupil dilation was observed in the High
Load/Threat condition, which drove the interaction effect. This
was significantly greater than Low Load/Threat [F(1, 14.864) =
12.429, p = 0.003] with no significant difference between High
Load/Safe and Low Load/Safe [F(1, 16.467) = 2.536, p = 0.130].
These results suggest that the greatest cognitive effort was
employed under High Load/Threat conditions. Whilst pupil dila-
tion has also been associated with emotional arousal there was
no main effect of Threat [F(1, 11.536) = 1.493, p = 0.130] suggest-
ing the observed effects were not due to the additive effects of
cognitive effort and arousal/pain but specifically to the increased
cognitive effort in the High Load/Threat condition. This result
is consistent with recent findings, for example Urry et al. (2009)
demonstrated that pupil diameter increased both when increasing
and decreasing an emotional response compared to maintaining
it, suggesting that pupil dilation is more sensitive to modula-
tion of cognitive demand than to small changes in emotional
arousal.
MAIN EFFECT IMAGING RESULTS
Main effect of WM load: high load—low load
No regions survived whole-brain cluster corrected thresholding,
however at an uncorrected z-threshold of 2.3 a cluster located in
the right dlPFC was found to be significantly more active in High
Load compared to Low Load blocks (see Table 1 and Figure 3).
This region has been previously associated with visuospatial WM
(e.g., Manoach et al., 2004), and also overlaps with frontal eye
field regions suggested to be important in maintaining spatial
location information during retention intervals inWM tasks (e.g.,
Postle, 2006; Ikkai and Curtis, 2011). There was also activation in
left dlPFC as well as right parietal regions which have been impli-
cated in working memory (Wager and Smith, 2003) and spatial
cognition (Sack, 2009) and occipital regions involved in visual
processing (Courtney and Ungerleider, 1997; Essen and Drury,
1997), again consistent with engagement in this spatial WM task.
Using a mask of regions involved inWM [constrained by infer-
ence meta-analysis map based on the term “Working Memory”
generated on neurosynth.org (Yarkoni et al., 2011)]. Two sepa-
rate clusters were extracted from the uncorrected data; a cluster in
right dlPFC and a small cluster in the angular gyrus of the right
parietal cortex. Activation in the right dlPFC cluster under the
High Load versus Low Load contrast displayed a positive corre-
lation with performance on the WM task under each condition
and with WM accuracy overall (r = 0.558, n = 18, p = 0.016).
However there was no correlation with WM performance under
the sameWM Load contrast (r = 0.321, n = 18, p = 0.194). This
supports the role of this region in this task and suggests that peo-
ple who are able to engage this regionmore underHigh Load than
Low Load conditions perform better in general on this task. The
parietal cluster was equivalent to less than five voxels in native
space and so further analysis was not conducted.
Main effect of threat: threat—safe
This contrast identified areas more active under threat of shock
than safety. Such a contrast is sensitive to areas involved in
anxiety but would also reveal brain regions responsible for down-
regulating emotion regardless of WM Load. Two significant
clusters of activation were revealed in the middle frontal gyrus
bilaterally, extending from a dorsal to amore ventral lateral region
in the left hemisphere, as well as the medial PFC and anterior
cingulate (see Table 1 and Figure 4).
Top-down control contrast: high load/threat > others
This contrast identified regions more active under the condition
proposed to engage top-down control (High Load/Threat) com-
pared to all others. Consistent with our hypotheses we identified
a significant cluster in the anterior cingulate and paracingu-
late gyrus as well as bilateral vlPFC activation (see Table 1 and
Figure 5). Whilst activation in these clusters under the top-down
control contrast did not correlate with task performance general
activation in these clusters correlated with overall task perfor-
mance in both the right vlPFC and the dACC cluster (r = 0.629,
n = 18, p = 0.005; r = 0.615, n = 18, p = 0.006, respectively)
suggesting that participants who generally display greater recruit-
ment of these regions whilst performing the task perform better
at the task.
Emotion modulation contrast: low load/threat > others
This region of interest analysis using an amygdala mask identi-
fied significant bilateral amygdala activation in Low Load/Threat
conditions compared to all others (see Figure 6). Activation in
this cluster was significantly higher under Low Load/Threat than
Low Load/Safe [mean difference = 0.17%, S.D = 0.17; t(17) =
4.191, p = 0.001] with no significant difference between High
Load/Threat and High Load/Safe [mean difference = −0.02%,
S.D = 0.25; t(17) = 0.294, p = 0.772]. Activation in this clus-
ter under this emotion modulation contrast correlated positively
with overall task performance (r = 0.541, n = 18, p = 0.021).
This correlation remained significant after controlling for Low
Load/Threat—Low Load/Safe activity in this amygdala cluster
(r = 0.518, n = 18, p = 0.033). Thus the correlation is not driven
by greater amygdala reactivity to threat under Low Load, but
rather suggests that general task performance in this emotional
control task was related to individual differences in the load-
dependent reduction of amygdala activity. However, it should be
noted that activation under this contrast did not correlate with
anxiety ratings (r = 0.130, n = 18, p = 0.606).
DYNAMIC CAUSAL MODELLING (DCM)
Based on the proposed mechanism of top-down control of sub-
cortical emotional regions, we employed dynamic causal model-
ing (DCM) (Friston et al., 2003) to probe potential connectivity
in the network of regions identified in the prior analyses. All
models included the right dlPFC region identified in the High
Load—Low Load contrast posited to represent working mem-
ory task-related activity, left vlPFC and dACC from the top-down
control contrast representing top-down control modules, and
bilateral amygdala from the emotion modulation contrast. No
constraints were placed on the models, permitting full bidi-
rectional connectivity between all four nodes. Both High Load
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Table 1 | Summary of imaging results for the main effect of WM Load, Threat, and the directed contrasts to investigate top-down control and
emotion modulation.
Contrast Local maxima (mm) Cluster size (mm3)
Z score x y z
High Load > Low Load
Uncorrected
r. Superior frontal gyrus 3.77 24 8 46 7056
r. Middle frontal gyrus 3.33 30 4 50
r. Angular gyrus 3.55 48 −50 56 5868
r. Lateral occipital cortex, superior division 3.18 40 −64 56
r. Superior parietal lobule 2.63 32 −70 56
l. Superior frontal gyrus 3.33 −24 10 58 2988
r. Postcentral gyrus 2.47 53 70 64 1764
Threat > Safety Cingulate gyrus, anterior division 5.03 0 22 26 62676
r. Frontal pole 4.67 24 58 24
Superior frontal gyrus 4.12 6 48 40
l. Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis 4.78 −50 14 18 48024
l. Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 4.39 −50 32 2
l. Middle frontal gyrus 4.22 −50 20 30
l. Frontal pole 4.21 −28 64 16
Top-down control contrast:
WM Load/Threat > Others
l. Middle frontal gyrus 3.67 −50 18 36 20952
l. Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis 3.63 −58 14 16
l. Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 3.57 −48 34 14
r. Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 4.1 54 34 12 18144
Frontal pole 3.67 38 95 48
Paracingulate gyrus 3.97 −8 30 28 16740
Cingulate gyrus, anterior division 3.61 −10 30 24
Emotion modulation:
Low Load/Threat > Others
(bilateral amygdala mask)
l. Amygdala 3.24 −22 −4 −18 2268
r. Amygdala 3.67 24 −6 −18 1836
Displaying the coordinates and Z-score of non-redundant local maxima for each cluster. Unless otherwise stated data was thresholded at z = 2.3 with cluster
thresholding (Worsley, 2001) to ensure a corrected p < 0.05.
conditions provided a driving input to the right dlPFC and both
Threat conditions to the amygdalae.
We were motivated to investigate the route by which top-
down control may act, hypothesizing that the modulation of the
detrimental effect of induced anxiety could proceed by inhibit-
ing some level of emotion processing, by facilitating task related
activity, or some combination of the two. To test this, we used
family inference, whereby families of models that differ only
on specific features of interest are contrasted in order to pro-
vide evidence for or against this specific characteristic (Penny
et al., 2010). In such inference, individual models in each fam-
ily are modeled as random samples from the total possible model
space, in much the same way as participants in an experiment
are modeled as random samples from a population. Accordingly,
we constructed three families with the same basic architecture
described above but differing in the target of top-down con-
trol: Emotion Modulation—30 models representing inhibition of
emotion processing where all possible combinations of connec-
tions between the amygdala and the two top-down nodes were
modulated by either High Load/Threat conditions or dACC acti-
vation, Working Memory Modulation—30 models representing
facilitation of task processing where all possible combinations of
connections between the right dlPFC and the top-down control
nodes were modulated, and Combined—30 models represent-
ing both emotional control and task-related control constrained
such that in each model the equivalent connections between the
top-down nodes and emotion and task nodes were modulated,
resulting in the same number of models in each family.
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FIGURE 3 | Top: High Load—Low Load contrast imaging results.
Threshold of z = 2.3 uncorrected. Bottom: A right dorsolateral cluster
displayed greater activation under High Load compared to Low Load in both
Safe and Threat trials [High Load/Safe—Low Load/Safe: mean difference =
0.121%, S.D = 0.178, t(17) = 2.880, p = 0.010; High Load/Threat—Low
Load/Threat: mean difference = 0.162%, S.D = 0.188, t(17) = 3.656,
p = 0.002]. Error bars display within-subject standard error (Morey, 2008).
∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
The observed data were fit to each model, and random effect
Bayesian model selection was used to estimate the posterior prob-
abilities of each model given the data. A random effects analysis
was used to permit different participants to favor different models
as may be the case if individual differences determine the pre-
dominance of an inhibitory or facilitative route. Based on this
the exceedance probability can be computed for each family, this
represents the probability that one family is more likely than
any other given the group data. Figure 7 displays the exceedance
probabilities for each family; this identified the winning fam-
ily as Emotion Modulation; the exceedance probability for this
family was 0.653 meaning we can be 65.3% confident that it
has a greater posterior probability than any other family. The
exceedance probability for the Working Memory Modulation
family was 0.263 and 0.085 for Combined (though it must be
noted that this family had the arbitrary constraint of only includ-
ing equivalent modulations of Emotion and Working Memory
connections). This result favors inhibition of emotional process-
ing as the most probable route by which top-down control acts in
this specific task.
FIGURE 4 | Top: Threat—Safety contrast imaging results. Two
significant clusters were identified revealing significant bilateral middle
frontal gyrus, medial PFC and dACC activation under Threat compared to
Safe conditions. Bottom: Pairwise comparisons of the signal change in the
clusters identified. Activation in both clusters was significantly greater
under Threat than Safety at both Low and High Load [left middle frontal
gyrus: Low Load/Threat—Low Load/Safe: mean difference = 0.153%,
S.D = 0.213, t(17) = 3.043, p = 0.007; High Load/Threat—High Load/Safe:
mean difference = 0.192%, S.D = 0.183, t(17) = 4.468, p < 0.001; right
middle frontal gyrus, medial PFC and dACC cluster: Low Load/Threat—Low
Load/Safe: mean difference = 0.149%, S.D = 0.146, t(17) = 4.335,
p < 0.001; High Load/Threat—High Load/Safe: mean difference = 0.147%,
S.D = 0.132, t(17) = 4.729, p < 0.001]. Error bars display within-subject
standard error (Morey, 2008). ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Classical inference on the parameter estimates across partici-
pants (weighted by the evidence of each model for each partic-
ipant) was conducted with a Bonferonni corrected p-threshold
of 0.0018 (see Figure 8 for model architecture and parameter
estimates). This revealed a significant decrease in both the amyg-
dalae to dACC connection [t(17) = −6.273, p = 0.00009] and
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FIGURE 5 | Top: Top-down control contrast imaging results. This
contrast revealed areas where activation was greater under High
Load/Threat conditions compared to all others. Three clusters were
identified: Dorsal ACC as well as bilateral PFC. Medial (upper panel) and
lateral (lower panel) views are displayed. Bottom: Pairwise comparisons of
the signal change in the regions identified. Activation in all three clusters
was greater under threat compared to safety under the equivalent working
memory loads, however this increase was only significant under High Load
[cingulate: High Load/Threat—High Load/Safe: mean difference = 0.139%,
S.D = 0.122, t(17) = 4.838, p < 0.001; left vlPFC: High Load/Threat—High
Load/Safe: mean difference = 0.197%, S.D = 0.181, t(17) = 4.614,
p < 0.001; right vlPFC: High Load/Threat—High Load/Safe: mean difference
= 0.288%, S.D = 0.236, t(17) = 5.176, p < 0.001]. Error bars display
within-subject standard error (Morey, 2008). ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
amygdalae to vlPFC connection [t(17) = −6.297, p < 0.00008]
under High Load/Threat conditions. The modulation of the
connection from the dACC to amygdalae displayed only a
trend to decrease [t(17) = −2.449, p = 0.025] and the vlPFC to
amygdalae connection did not display significant modulation
under High Load/Threat conditions [t(17) = −0.855, p = 0.404].
Additionally, the dlPFC to vlPFC connections were significantly
FIGURE 6 | Top: Emotion modulation contrast imaging results. This
contrast revealed areas where activation was greater under Low
Load/Threat conditions compared to all others. A ROI analysis was carried
out using a bilateral amygdala mask (red). Bottom: Pairwise comparisons
of the signal change. Activation in the amygdala cluster displayed a
load-dependent modulation by threat with increased amygdala activation
under threat compared to safety in Low Load but not High Load conditions
[Low Load/Threat—Low Load/Safe: mean difference = 0.170%,
S.D = 0.172, t(17) = 4.191, p = 0.001; High Load/Threat—High Load/Safe:
mean difference = 0.018%, S.D = 0.254, t(17) = 0.294, p < 0.772]. Error
bars display within-subject standard error (Morey, 2008). ∗p < 0.05
(two-tailed).
increased by High Load/Threat [t(17) = 5.351, p = 0.000053]
whilst the dlPFC to dACC connection displayed a borderline
significant modulation[t(17) = 3.168, p = 0.0056].
Taken together these results suggest that whilst the family
inference favors inhibition of emotion, there is also some evidence
(in the dlPFC to vlPFC connection) for facilitation ofWM-related
activity. Furthermore, there is stronger evidence that this mecha-
nism acts by suppressing the output of the amygdala in the case
of inhibition of emotional processing and by boosting the output
of the dlPFC in the case of facilitating task activity than by modu-
lating the activity of these regions directly. Additionally, we found
significant negative bidirectional connectivity between the amyg-
dala and right dlPFC [amygdala to dlPFC: t(17) = −7.573, p =
0.000001; dlPFC to amygdala: t(17) = −11.543, p < 0.000001],
consistent with interacting inhibitory emotional and cognitive
networks (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008;
Dichter et al., 2010). Given that amygdala and dlPFC have few
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FIGURE 7 | Bayesian model selection for families. The Emotion Modulation family displayed the greatest exceedance probability, favoring models where
connections between top-down nodes and the amygdala were modulated over ones with modulation of connections between top-down and task-related nodes.
if any direct structural connections (Porrino et al., 1981; Barbas
and De Olmos, 1990; Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002; Freese and
Amaral, 2009), this last result suggests that a mutually inhibitory
cognitive-emotional connection cannot be adequately explained
by indirect pathways through the vlPFC or dACC, implying the
existence of another indirect pathway.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF NON-EMOTIONAL TOP-DOWN CONTROL
SCORES
We hypothesized that individual differences in people’s perfor-
mance on a non-emotional top-down control task would predict
their recruitment of regions implicated in top-down control of
emotion. To address this issue a regression analysis was performed
using the index of non-emotional top-down control taken from
the behavioral dichotic listening task as a regressor in the between
subjects GLM of the emotional top-down control contrast. This
would reveal brain regions for which non-emotional top-down
control ability predicts activation associated with emotional top-
down control.
A number of regions displayed this relationship (see Table 2).
As hypothesized both the left vlPFC and dACC showed greater
activation under this top-down control contrast in subjects who
were better at the unrelated non-emotional attentional control
task (left vlPFC: r = 0.927, n = 18, p < 0.001; cingulate: r =
0.825, n = 18, p < 0.001) (see Figure 9).
In addition to prefrontal regions implicated in top-down con-
trol widespread activation related to visual processing was discov-
ered by this analysis, including a large cluster covering right lateral
and mid occipital cortex, V1 and V2 as well as a smaller cluster
in left lateral occipital cortex. This finding was not hypothesized
but is consistent with individual differences in the ability to direct
attention in the dichotic listening correlating with the ability to
direct attention to the visual domain in this spatial WM task.
Clusters were also identified bilaterally in the postcentral gyrus
of the parietal cortex, relating to primary somatosensory cortex.
Activity in these regions specifically under the top-down con-
trol contrast correlated with performance on the dichotic lis-
tening task; general activity in these regions did not (with the
exception of the left somatosensory cluster (r = −0.548, n =
18, p = 0.019). Thus the index of top-down attentional control
predicts the recruitment of these regions under the conditions
posited to require top-down emotional control, and not their gen-
eral recruitment across all conditions. Furthermore, there was no
direct correlation between the index of top-down control on the
dichotic listening task and WM performance on the emotional
control task (r = 0.191, n = 18, p = 0.447).
In the emotional control task, error rates differed across con-
ditions and so present a potential confound for the results since
dACC has been shown to be sensitive to errors (Kiehl et al., 2000;
Menon et al., 2001). However activity under the top-down con-
trol contrast in both the cingulate cluster identified in the main
effect analysis and in the regression analysis did not show any
correlation with errors made in the WM task (r = 0.366, n = 18,
p = 0.135; r = 0.239, n = 18, p = 0.341), meaning that activity
observed in this contrast cannot be attributed to higher error
rates.
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated how interfering effects of threat
induced anxiety can be modulated in order to focus on current
tasks. We demonstrated how threat-related interference can be
overcome by increasing the load of a cognitive task; in this case
interference of anxiety under threat of shock on a visual spa-
tial WM task was eradicated when the WM load was increased.
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FIGURE 8 | Architecture of the model: Two top-down control nodes, left
vlPFC and cingulate, from the top-down control contrast, a task-related
node, right dlPFC, from the uncorrected High Load—Low Load contrast
and an emotion node from the emotion modulation contrast. All
threatening conditions had a driving input to the amygdala and all High Load
conditions to the right dlPFC. Modulation of connections by High Load/Threat
are also displayed. Full connectivity was permitted between all nodes.
Average parameter estimates for each intrinsic connection, driving input and
modulation are displayed. ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed; uncorrected).
∗∗p < 0.05(two-tailed, Bonferonni correction applied).
Activation in dorsal ACC and ventrolateral PFC under high
working memory load with threat of shock was consistent with
their hypothesized roles in top-down control, suggesting they
are recruited to modulate the interfering effects of emotion.
Furthermore, a bilateral amygdala cluster displayed significantly
greater activation under threat of shock compared to safety at
low load but no effect of threat at a higher WM load, providing
evidence that cognitive load can modulate threat-related amyg-
dala activity. Dynamical Causal Modeling further suggested that
this top-down control might be achieved through inhibition of
ascending outputs from the amygdala to the prefrontal cortex.
The interaction between anxiety and cognition is not straight-
forward; anxiety is an adaptive mechanism that plays a vital
role in warning of potential threats which might occur at any
time, including when we are occupied with other activities.
Accordingly, anxiety increases sensitivity to potential threats even
when people are engaged in highly demanding perceptual tasks
(Cornwell et al., 2007, 2011). Anxiety can disrupt ongoing cog-
nitive processing due to competition for limited capacity WM
resources (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004), for visuospatial attention
resources (Shackman et al., 2006), by disrupting the functioning
of the goal-directed attentional system (Eysenck et al., 2007), or
via an automatic reciprocal interaction between ventral ‘limbic’
regions and dorsal executive areas (e.g., Dolcos and McCarthy,
2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dichter et al., 2010). Despite its priv-
ileged role in alerting us of danger, however, it is clear that
interference by anxiety can be overcome in certain situations.
Our results are consistent with a number of studies that suggest
that increasing cognitive or attentional load reduces processing
in emotion response regions such as the amygdala. For example,
Taylor et al. (2003) and Northoff et al. (2004) found that even
relatively simple tasks can affect neural activation in emotion-
associated regions, and VanDillen et al. (2009) demonstrated that
activation in the amygdala is reduced by increasing cognitive load
even when the emotional stimuli precede the task.
These results highlight a potential difference between top-
down control of emotional versus non-emotional interference.
In the non-emotional domain, for example, evidence exists that
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Table 2 | Summary of imaging results for regression analysis under the top-down control contrast.
Contrast Local maxima (mm) Cluster size (mm3) Pearson’s r. N = 18
Z score x y z
Dichotic listening: Top-down
control contrast regression
analysis
Visual cortex V1 4.46 2 −80 12 50220 0.843**
r. Lateral occipital cortex,
inferior division
4.07 30 −88 0
l. Inferior frontal gyrus,
pars opercularis
4.25 −54 16 0 33048 0.928**
l. Inferior frontal gyrus,
pars triangularis
3.74 −52 26 14
l. Precentral gyrus 4.42 −42 −16 56 22932 0.606**
l. Postcentral gyrus 3.9 −42 −34 56
r. Inferior parietal lobule 3.5 60 −30 44 15012 0.709**
r. Postcentral gyrus 3.41 36 −30 48
Paracingulate gyrus 4.11 4 48 20 13536 0.828**
Cingulate gyrus, anterior
division
3.69 0 22 22
l. Lateral occipital cortex,
superior division
4.01 −34 −80 18 13212 0.714**
l. Lateral occipital cortex,
inferior division
3.41 −46 −78 −6
This identifies regions whose activation under the top-down control contrast (High Load/Threat > Others) correlates with dichotic listening scores; Pearson’s r are
displayed. ** indicates significance at 01 (two-tailed). Data were thresholded at z = 2.3 with cluster thresholding (Worsley, 2001) to ensure a corrected p < 0.05.
when cognitive/executive load is increased, interference from
task-irrelevant information is exacerbated, as explained by the
load theory of attention and cognitive control proposed by Lavie
et al. (2004). It is possible, however, that at least partially sep-
arate mechanisms exist for the top-down control of emotion.
Emotional stimuli are a special case of distractors; although
they might be irrelevant to the explicit task, they signal events
with high potential significance to wellbeing and are preferen-
tially and automatically processed (e.g., Dolan and Vuilleumier,
2003; Alpers and Gerdes, 2007; Stout et al., 2013). This might
particularly be the case when the interference comes from an
induced emotion as opposed to perception of an emotional stim-
ulus (which may or may not elicit an emotional response). If
emotional information can be automatically processed, there
is no reason why it should necessarily interfere with cognitive
processing—whether or not it does so might therefore be depen-
dent on the nature of the ongoing task and the strength of
top-down control. Although Shackman et al. (2006), observed
interference from threat of shock in a 3-back condition, we
only observed this interference at a lower WM load (2-back)
using a very similar task. However, differences in task difficulty
might explain this apparent discrepancy; Shackman et al. (2006)
employed 6 different locations with the stimuli presented for
500ms with 2500ms intervals between presentations. In con-
trast, the current study, based on piloting evidence, employed 8
locations [differing in position and extent of overlap to Shackman
et al. (2006)] and the stimuli were present for just 350ms with
1500ms intervals. Future psychophysical studies will be needed
to characterize under exactly what WM load or task difficulty
conditions top-down control reduces threat-related interference.
If threat cannot be processed entirely automatically, however,
an alternative explanation to an active top-down control theory
that could account for the reduced interference of threat under
greater cognitive task demands must be acknowledged. Depletion
of cognitive or attentional resources might prevent emotional
stimuli from being processed sufficiently to interfere with the task
(the latter case would be similar to how Lavie et al. (2004) explain
the lack of interference from perceptual distractors under high
perceptual load). In this experiment, we used threat of shock,
rather than shock itself or other unpleasant stimuli such as pic-
tures presented concurrent with the WM task, so that there was
no overt emotional stimulus to be processed during task perfor-
mance. However, it is still possible that emotional information
such as heightened anxiety, even in the absence of a stimulus,
might not be processed under highWM load due toWM capacity
limits. Despite evidence from a large number of studies suggesting
that affective stimuli can be at least partially processed automati-
cally without the need for attention (e.g., Morris et al., 1998, 2001;
Dolan and Vuilleumier, 2003), some studies suggest that this is
not always the case (e.g., Pessoa et al., 2002). However, although
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FIGURE 9 | Top: Top-down control regression imaging results overlaid
on main effect top-down control (red). This identified regions where
activation under the top-down control contrast in the emotional control task
correlated with the index of attentional control from the dichotic listening
task. Medial (upper panel) and lateral (lower panel) views are displayed.
Dorsal ACC and left vlPFC identified by this analysis displayed some overlap
with the main effect top-down control results. Bottom: Pairwise
comparisons of the signal change in the regions identified. Both regions
displayed a significant increase in activation under threat compared to
safety in High Load conditions [Cingulate: High Load/Threat—High
Load/Safe: mean difference = 0.104%, S.D = 0.170, t(17) = 2.585,
p = 0.019; left vlPFC: High Load/Threat—High Load/Safe: mean difference
= 0.143%, S.D = 0.194, t(17) = 3.133, p = 0.006]. The cingulate also
displayed a borderline significant increase under threat in Low Load
conditions [mean difference = 0.044%, S.D = 0.089, t(17) = 2.094,
p = 0.052]. Error bars display within-subject standard error (Morey, 2008).
∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
the finding of a load dependent modulation of amygdala activ-
ity in the current study is consistent with both an active control
mechanism and a resource depletion account, regions implicated
in top-down control were recruited under High Load/Threat con-
ditions and a Threat × WM Load interaction was observed in the
pupil data, with greatest dilation under High Load/Threat. Both
these results suggest that there was increased cognitive load in
the High Load/Threat condition (Beatty, 1982; Steinhauer and
Hakerem, 1992; Johnstone et al., 2007), which would not be
expected if threat information was not being processed. It seems
likely, then, that in the high cognitive load condition, threat infor-
mation was processed but was actively prevented from interfering
with WM performance.
The proposed active control mechanism could act by facili-
tating the task at hand, inhibiting the interfering effect of the
emotion or a combination of the two. Some studies suggest there
are dissociable neural systems implementing top-down control
in emotional and non-emotional contexts (Ochsner et al., 2008;
Mincic, 2010), with the distinction being that non-emotional
interference is overcome with facilitation of task-related activ-
ity whilst emotional interference is overcome by active inhibition
(Egner et al., 2008). In the current study there was greater sup-
port for the active inhibition of emotional processing; amygdala
activation under Threat displayed a load-dependent modula-
tion, with no activation to threat of shock at High Load. Under
the High Load condition, however, there was also a trend for
improvement in WM accuracy under Threat compared to Safe
conditions, which might suggest some role of facilitation of task
performance under High Load and Threat. Additionally, the
increased cognitive effort in High Load/Threat trials indicated
by the pupil dilation data may represent either the additional
engagement of top-down regulatory mechanisms of the emo-
tional interference or increased cognitive effort in the WM task.
Dynamic causal modeling was exploited to further probe the
proposed circuitry. Models were partitioned into distinct families
dependent on whether the pattern of modulation of connections
was consistent with an emotion inhibition or WM task facilita-
tion account. Family level inference found greater evidence that
emotional interference is overcome by inhibition of emotional
processing. Interestingly, the DCM analysis provided evidence
that top-down control acts via the modulation of amygdala out-
put, in addition to direct reduction of amygdala activity. The
current results relate only to estimates of effective connectiv-
ity. Determining the precise anatomical routes and physiological
mechanisms by which this control is implemented is a chal-
lenge for future studies, perhaps making use of diffusion tensor
imaging to characterize the white matter pathways and pharma-
cological manipulations and/or magnetic resonance spectroscopy
to understand the neurotransmitters involved.
A related issue is that although the ability to modulate interfer-
ing effects of emotion is significant in itself, it is not clear whether
this requires a concomitant regulation in emotional experience.
This highlights the multifactorial nature of emotions, which are
made up of subjective feelings, physiological and neurological
responses, as well as cognitive processes and action tendencies
(Scherer, 2000). Whilst these components are related, their inter-
action with ongoing cognitive task demands may be somewhat
distinct. For example, Dvorak-Bertsch et al. (2007) demonstrated
that fear-potentiated startle can be modulated by working mem-
ory load and Vytal et al. (2012) observed eradication of interfer-
ence from anxiety and diminished fear-potentiated startle with
increasing WM load. In contrast, the current study observed a
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load-dependentmodulation of emotional interference in theWM
task along with a load-dependent modulation of amygdala acti-
vation, but failed to regulate subjective ratings of anxiety. This
may reflect the relative lack of sensitivity of the self-report mea-
sure and/or demand characteristics, or that the top-down control
required to focus on the task does not reduce the subjective expe-
rience of anxiety. It should be noted that the current study is
limited by the lack of additional valence sensitive online measures
of emotion, such as facial EMG, or skin conductance measures.
We also examined whether individual differences in the per-
formance of a completely non-emotional attentional control task
(a dichotic listening task) would predict the recruitment of brain
regions involved in the top-down control of threat. A regression
analysis identified a number of such brain regions including both
dACC and left vlPFC. Dorsal ACC and vlPFC have been associ-
ated with both emotion regulation (Blair et al., 2007; Ochsner and
Gross, 2008; VanDillen et al., 2009) and cognitive control (Herath
et al., 2001; Dux et al., 2006). We propose that this correlation
reflects these brain regions’ common roles in both top-down con-
trol during a WM task in the presence of threat-provoked anxiety
as well as during an auditory task with the need to selectively
ignore irrelevant, non-emotional auditory information. The two
tasks, as well as the type of distracting information, were deliber-
ately chosen to be very different, making it unlikely that findings
common to both tasks are due to the specifics of the stimuli or of
task-specific processing demands.
Several studies have implicated regions of the cingulate in dif-
ferent types of cognitive control (see Vogt et al., 1992; Carter
et al., 1999; Bush et al., 2000; Shackman et al., 2011 for reviews).
Specifically, studies posit a role in monitoring when top-down
control is required and recruiting the appropriate regions to
implement this control (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a,b).Many stud-
ies suggest the cingulate monitors conflict including studies of the
Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004), Simon task (Peterson et al., 2002;
Kerns, 2006), and go/no-go paradigms (Braver et al., 2001), with
evidence suggesting this conflict indicates the need for top-down
control. Detection of conflict by the cingulate leads to recruit-
ment of prefrontal regions necessary to implement this control
(Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns, 2006). Similar regions of ACC have
also been implicated in the processing of pain and affect. A recent
meta-analysis of 192 imaging studies of cognitive control, nega-
tive affect and pain (Shackman et al., 2011) identified a region
of the cingulate largely overlapping the region we found in the
regression on dichotic listening scores (see Figure 9). Shackman
et al. (2011) propose that this region of cingulate serves a gen-
eral role in adaptive control, defined as being ‘to bias responding
in situations where the optimal course of action is uncertain or
entails competition between alternative courses’ (Shackman et al.,
2011, p. 161). The connections of this region of cingulate cortex
with other brain regions would support different types of adap-
tive control depending on the specific context. Connections with
pre-motor andmotor regions make dACC a suitable candidate for
modifying, initiating or potentiating task-relevant motor actions.
Connections with dorsal and lateral prefrontal cortex would
enable biasing of attention and WM resources towards task-
relevant information while connections with ventral prefrontal
areas and limbic regions would allow for direct modulation of
emotional responses. Thus whilst the dACC may serve an impor-
tant role in emotion regulation, viewing its function in a broader
context could help to elucidate more fully the role it plays.
Whilst the current results are consistent with this domain general
view of dACC function the conclusions that can be drawn from
such regression analyses are limited and the correlation between
recruitment of these regions and dichotic listening performance
could be mediated by other factors. In order to fully address this
it is necessary to perform functional imaging on the same partic-
ipants completing both emotional and non-emotional top-down
control tasks in future studies.
A further point is that although we hypothesize the existence
of domain-general top-down control mechanisms which can be
recruited in different contexts, they do not preclude the existence
of neural circuitry involved in emotion regulation more specifi-
cally. For example, in the case of more voluntary emotion regula-
tion such as that engaged in studies of emotion reappraisal, there
is substantial evidence for the involvement of neural regions such
as the orbitofrontal cortex (Lévesque et al., 2003; Goldin et al.,
2008) that assign, or reassign, affective meaning or hedonic value
to stimuli. In such situations then, one might expect domain-
general mechanisms to interact with more emotion-specific or
process-specific mechanisms.
The precise mechanisms by which top-down control can
maintain task performance in the presence of threat or other
sources of emotional interference, and the conditions under
which such control mechanisms are effective or break down is
highly clinically relevant. For example dysfunction in the neural
circuitry that supports the top-down regulation of emotion has
been demonstrated in several psychological disorders including
bipolar disorder (Foland et al., 2008), schizophrenia (Blasi et al.,
2009), depression (Johnstone et al., 2007; Joormann et al., 2007),
PTSD (Shin et al., 2001) and several anxiety disorders (Campbell-
Sills et al., 2011; Blair et al., 2012). Indeed, the wide range of
psychopathologies linked to deficits in emotion regulation has
been recognized in several recent reviews (Phillips et al., 2003;
Taylor and Liberzon, 2007; Amstadter, 2008; Dillon et al., 2011;
Berking andWupperman, 2012). Studies of these psychopatholo-
gies have understandably focused on the affective nature of any
deficits, however a relationship between emotional cognitive con-
trol and non-affective cognitive control suggests that deficits in
other domains may also be apparent. For example, trait anxiety
is linked to a diminished recruitment of prefrontal attentional
control mechanisms to inhibit the processing of non-emotional
distractors (Bishop, 2009) and deficits in executive functions have
been observed in a number of psychological disorders including
depression (Paelecke-Habermann et al., 2005; Siegle et al., 2007),
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia (Moritz et al.,
2002). It is possible that specific combinations of dysfunction
in emotion-specific versus domain-general adaptive control will
correspond to distinct symptoms or sub-categories of mood and
affective disorders, though this speculative proposal has yet to be
tested.
The current study demonstrates a load-dependent modula-
tion of the interfering effects of induced anxiety and provides
evidence that this occurs by an active mechanism favoring inhi-
bition of emotional processing over task facilitation, though the
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predominance of either route under different contexts requires
further study. We also show that the ability to exert attentional
control on a completely independent non-emotional task predicts
the recruitment of vlPFC and dACC in this emotional control
task, consistent with a proposed role in domain general top-down
control, of which emotion regulation is just one example. The
interaction between these emotional and cognitive networks is
relevant to the understanding of a range of psychopathologies and
further elucidation of how these networks interact as well as how
they are modulated under different contexts is crucial.
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